Hurricane Camille decimated buildings at Henderson Point with waves up to 22.4 feet above mean sea level. Yet, in 1984 a 69-unit condominium project was built on land leveled during Hurricane Camille at Henderson Point . This project is built as a replica of the old Biloxi Yacht Club on the south side of Highway 90 in a location where the original building was washed away by Hurricane
Camille.
-Except from Roger A. Pielke, et al, (1999) Gulf-triggered full-scale evacuations of the same areas, revealing many of the same weaknesses of preparedness procedures that were observed during Katrina. If that were not enough, just weeks before the storm planners in New Orleans engaged in a training exercise that simulated the impact of a hypothetical hurricane-Pam-that breached the levees of New Orleans, submerging 87% of the city. Finally, the warnings of impending catastrophe could not have been stronger or more accurate in the days and hours leading up the storm's landfall. Substantial numbers of residents nevertheless failed to heed urgent warnings to leave, few organized efforts were made to assist those who lacked the means to do so, and governments failed to have sufficient resources in place to deal with the disaster when it was realized.
What went wrong? Lost in the debate over affixing blame is the fact that the human errors that amplified the tragedy were, in many cases, no less predictable than the storm itself. Over the past four decades a sizable academic literature has emerged warning of the inherent weakness that exist when individuals-both planners and residents-are faced with making decisions about protection from low-probability, highconsequence, events. In many ways, Hurricane Katrina was a case study of these weaknesses: opportunities to learn from experience went unexploited, mitigation measures with long-run benefits were under-funded, and the principals emerged as both overconfident before the event and overmatched afterward. Indeed, one might argue that as Hurricane Katrina bore down on Louisiana on evening of August 28th, the residents of Louisiana and Mississippi faced what was, in fact, a greater risk than they knew-one born in the failure of advance planning to anticipate the frailties of likely limitations of human responses to the storm.
The purpose of this essay is to review some of what we know about the inherent biases that arise when individuals and planners try to make decisions about mitigation against low-probability, high-consequence events, and steps that can be taken to mitigate these biases. Although the essay finds motivation in the Katrina tragedy, its lessons are meant to go well beyond a retrospective understanding of this one event. Eight months before Katrina the world stood similarly puzzled why governments around the Indian Ocean had shown little interest in investing in tsunami warning systems that might have averted that disaster, and two months after Katrina lamented the slow pace of rescue and recovery efforts designed to aid victims of a catastrophic earthquake in Pakistan.
The evidence I draw on comes from a variety of sources. In addition to experimental and field data collected in other domains, I draw evidence from a series of laboratory studies conducted at the Wharton School shortly after Hurricane Katrina in which individuals engaged in a realistic hurricane simulation that posed them with the repeated problem of deciding how much-and when-to invest in protection against approaching tropical storms. One of the major findings of this work was that even in this atmosphere of heightened awareness many of the decisions biases that occurred during Katrina were reproduced in the lab-and did not vanish with mere repetition.
The overriding theme of the essay is that mitigation errors emanate from fundamental limitations in how we learn from the past, foresee the future, and make trade-offs in time. Specifically our ability to make optimal mitigation decisions is hindered by three deep-rooted biases:
1. A tendency to learn by focusing on short-term feedback; 2. A tendency to see the future as a simple extrapolation of the present; and 3. A tendency to overly discount the value of ambiguous future rewards compared to short-term costs.
When taken together, these limitations provide a unifying account of many of the biases that have been observed in real-world mitigation decisions, and, most critically, why we seem to have such difficulty correcting them.
Learning Biases: Why experience is not always the best teacher
On Tuesday, September 14, 2004 These words, of course, are almost chilling in their portent. Less than a year later as an even stronger Hurricane Katrina approached the dilemma faced by emergency planners in New Orleans was essentially unchanged. Again 100,000 of the city's poorest had little means of complying with evacuation calls, and the Superdome was no better equipped to serve as a long-run shelter.
Why did the city seem to learn so little from the false-alarm of Ivan? One explanation is that it simply reflects an all-too-familiar bias in how we naturally learn: by and large, we are much better at learning from the mistakes we actually make than those we almost make. History is replete with apparent examples; prior to the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster engineers had data showing that the O-rings in booster rockets tended to deteriorate when the Shuttle was launched in low temperatures. Because these events did not result in structural failures, however, there was little motivation either change launch policies or invest in costly re-designs. Then, seventeen years later, it took the breakup of the Shuttle Columbia upon re-entry to remedy a known tendency for pieces of foam to break off from the same booster rockets during launch. In the domain of natural hazards, Brown and Hoyt (2000) offer evidence that a significant predictor of individuals' decisions to purchase federal flood insurance is simply whether flood losses are incurred in the previous year-an effect observed after controlling for such factors as price, income, and whether the homeowner had engages in other kinds of mitigation.
Why are we prone to learn this way? The most fundamental culprit might simply be cognitive evolution. Through time we have developed strong instincts to learn things by trial and error, avoiding actions (or inactions) that yield bad outcomes and repeating those that yield good ones. It is, after all, how we learn to walk, acquire food preferences, and develop video-game skills. The problem comes when this-otherwise efficient-approach to learning is applied to settings where replications are few and the feedback we receive is noisy-the very features that define low-probability, highconsequence events. In such environments learning by trial-and-error can be frustratingly slow, marked by tendencies to draw the wrong associations between actions and outcomes, and a cyclical recurrence of under-investment errors. The nature of these limitations will be reviewed in turn.
The paradox of feedback.
In late October of 2005 hurricane warnings were issued for South Florida in advance of as Hurricane Wilma. A general evacuation was ordered for the Keys, and residents throughout the region were urged to begin taking preparations such as securing supplies of bottled water and batteries and filling the cars with gas. To South Floridians these actions would have been all-too familiar; it was the fourth time that year that hurricane warnings had been issued for the region, and the seventh time in the past two years. Yet, after Wilma had departed there was widespread evidence of under preparation, particularly in highly-populated cities of Miami and Ft. Lauderdale: people stood in hours-long lines awaiting supplies of bottled water after a boil-water order was issued, and gas lines stretched, in some cases, for miles. Florida Governor, Jeb Bush expressed the frustration felt by many planners when seeing the lines:
"People had ample time to prepare. It isn't that hard to get 72 hours worth of food and water," (October 26, 2005) But this chastisement comes with a point of irony: the remarks were made in the context of a speech to Media in which he conceded that the State, for its part, had under-prepared for the possibility of under-preparation by its citizens.
Why did this happen? One explanation is that while residents had extensive experience in preparing for storms, far fewer had direct experience recovering from them: almost all of the previous hurricane warnings had proven to be false alarms. As trial-and-error learners, what people in southeast Florida were instinctively learning was not that preparation actions were essential, but rather that hurricane hazards can be survived without them In a separate paper (Meyer and Kunreuther 2005) we provide a theoretical treatment of the ability of naïve learning rules to naturally discover optimal mitigation strategies. One of the key insights is that when mitigation is truly effective, even in highly noisy environments people should-given enough time-come to discover its value, even if their decision-making skills go no further than repeating actions that seemed to work in the past, and abandoning those that did not. Real-world examples of such evolutionary adaptation are widespread; early European explorers of the Yucatan, for example were initially puzzled by the absence of major settlements along the coast of the Caribbean sea-a settlement strategy later attributed to the high incidence of hurricanes and tropical storms that strike the area (Williams and Sheets 2002) . The downside of trial-and-error algorithms applied to low-probability events, however, is that speed of learning can be quite slow, hindered by temporal stretches where acts of mitigation receive no positive reinforcement.
An example of problems caused by sparse feedback is the often-hear critique of warning systems: while they are essential in the prevention of losses of lives and property, they may also act to discourage marginal propensities to comply when warnings are issued. The problem is this that because warning zones are invariably much larger than impact zones, for most people warnings prove to be false alarms. The effect of such repeated exposure to false-alarms is that it both diminishes overt beliefs in reliability of warnings (for a supporting example in the context of medical testing, see Luce and Kahn 1999) , as well as the perceived relationship between mitigation acts and safety. While emergency management officials planners might try to offset this by repeatedly reminding residents of what would have happened had the hazard struck and they were not prepared, such calls are often lost in the sea of more tangible real evidence that protective actions were taken that were unneeded.
When correct outcomes teach us the wrong thing
A perhaps even more disturbing feature of trial-and-error learning is that even the absence of false alarms there is no guarantee that it will lead to optimal mitigation decisions. In fact, in some cases successful learning will be self-defeating: the more one invests in mitigation against hazards, the less one is likely to receive feedback that encourages additional investments; i.e., the experience of losses. This censoring bias is difficult to overcome: because the decision maker cannot observe the counter-factual of what would have happened had a mitigation investment not been made, he or she will be unsure whether to attribute the lack of damage to the mitigation investment or the docility of the hazard itself. That is, it is quite possible that no losses would have been incurred even if no investment had been made in mitigation. Given such a feedback structure, a trial-and-error learner would have a tough time making progress; the more he or she invested in protection, the more ambiguous the feedback that would be received about its benefits. One might thus see evolutionary convergence to a world of limited remedies; damage caused by hazards induces an initial round of investments in protection, but the very success of these investments then limits the motivation to make further investments (Meyer and Kunreuther 2005) .
A case example of such a truncated learning process might be found in the repeated decisions by state and federal governments to under-fund flood control projects in greater New Orleans prior to Hurricane Katrina. After the floods of Hurricane Betsy in 1965 the federal government authorized funding to bolster the levee system around the city-the Lake Ponchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project. Although the project was not expected to be completed until 1978, by 1969 the early stages of investment had already paid off: the city was spared flooding when Hurricane Camillea much stronger storm than Betsy--passed just to the east. But, ironically, this successcombined with the lack of storms in the years that followed--seemed to deflate rather than spur interest in completing the project. Reduced funding (combined with cost overruns) forced planned dates of completion to be postponed-first to 1991, then 2008. In addition, recommendations made in 1982 to upgrade the original plan for the height of the levees around New Orleans was never funded (U.S. Corps of Engineers, 1982) . The longer New Orleans went without a flood, the harder it was to make politically-expedient case for a multi-billion dollars investment in additional protection.
The presence of ambiguous feedback can also produce also an opposite-and more perverse-consequence: the perpetuation of superstitious beliefs about protection.
The flip side of the tendency for ambiguous feedback to preclude people from fully investing in mitigation when it is truly effective is that it can also fail to extinguish tendencies to invest in mitigation measures that are, in fact ineffective. As an example, for years it had been a time-honored belief throughout the Midwest that the best way of insuring that one's house did not blow apart during a tornado was to open its windows in advance of the storm. The logic was that open windows would act to equalize the pressure between the inside and outside of the house as the funnel passed, reducing the tendency for houses to "explode". It was not until the early 1980s that it was conclusively shown that this is not why houses fell apart during tornados--open windows and doors were, in fact, the cause of collapse, not the remedy. Winds coming in through open windows and doors tended to destabilize roofs which, in turn, tended to destabilize walls.
Why did (and does) the myth of open windows prove so persistent? The reason is spurious reinforcement. If a person lost their house in a twister, they would be motivated to seek remedies that would prevent the calamity from recurring in the future--in this case adopting the wisdom if opening windows in advance of the storm. They next time home is threatened by a tornado the homeowner will thus open the windows-and likely find positive results. The reason, however, would not be because the measure was effective, but because the odds that a house will survive a brush with a tornado are far greater than being demolished by it (windows open or not). Moreover, even if the owner had the misfortune of having the house destroyed again, the outcome would more likely be attributed to the overwhelming force of the twister rather the possibility that the homeowner's own actions contributed to the calamity.
A key implication of the above ideas is that learning about mitigation investments is likely to be a frustratingly slow process, one that may never achieve individually (or socially) optimal levels. The advent of a disaster at one point in time triggers a rash of reactive protective actions designed to preclude a recurrence. But the most likely subsequent feedback decision makers will receive after that works to suppress, rather than enhance, subsequent investments. The fact that most encounters are false-alarms provides an overtly negative association between investments and outcomes.
Likewise, the very effectiveness of mitigation works to make the cues that are needed to trigger additional investments-losses-less likely to be encountered in the future.
Hence, what likely emerges is a slow proves where societies learn the wisdom of mitigation only in fits and starts.
A different take on decision errors: imperfect mental models
While the mistakes we see in mitigation decisions might well resemble a trialand-error learning process, few would suggest that this is the actual mechanism that produces errors. Rather, in most cases mitigation decisions involve at least an attempt to engage in a reasoned process that trades off costs with benefits. In this view, if a coastal resident elects not to evacuate in the face on an going hurricane, it is not simply because she has been conditioned to do so, but because she consciously perceives the benefits of leaving (such as eliminating the risk of drowning) are overshadowed by the perceived costs-such as that of securing lodging and making the home vulnerable to looting.
Kunreuther's chapter in this volume states this view of decision making more precisely. Consider a decision maker who faces some hazard z and considers investing in protective action k that has a cost c. Whether the decision maker chooses to invest in protection is presumed to rest on three beliefs: that about the probability that the hazard will occur (p(z)), that about the range or distribution of possible losses given that no investment is made (a distribution with mean or expectation E(l)), and that about the range or distribution of possible losses given mitigation (a distribution with mean E(l|k)).
Under this calculus a decision maker would invest in mitigation if

p(z) [E(l)-E(l|k)]>c;
( 1) that is, if the probability-weighted expected benefits of reducing expected losses from
Under this view of decision making, the errors in mitigation decisions described above have their origins in mistaken beliefs about either the likelihood of hazards (p(z))
or errors in forecasts of likely consequences (E(l) and E(i|k)). What we know about these conjectural errors will be review in turn.
Seeing is believing: biases in inferences about likelihood
The finding noted above that mitigation decisions are overly-responsive shortterm feedback potentially has a more cognitive explanation in terms of expression (1): people are acting this way not as a conditioned response, but because they are forming beliefs about the likelihood of hazards by looking at just the most recent data, underweighting long-term base rates of hazards. Supportive of this, there is ample evidence that subjective perceptions of the probability of hazards often dramatically departs from actuarial values in a way that is suggestive of an excessive focus on recent (or more memorable) instances (Kahneman and Tversky 1973; Lerrner, et al 2003) ..
For example, Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, and Fischhoff (2003) report data showing that when a sample of 973 Americans were asked to provide an estimate of the probability that they will be harmed by violent crime in the course of the coming year, the mean estimate was 43%--an -exaggerated estimate just slight less than the perceived likelihood of getting the flu (47%). Likewise, Hakes and Viscussi (2004) report that people perceive deaths from accidental discharges of firearms-a comparatively rare event--as being far more likely that accidental falls-a comparatively common one.
Finally, Burger and Palmer (1992) report evidence showing how California Bay residents' beliefs about the likelihood they would suffer personal harm from a natural disaster rose immediately after their encounter with the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquakeonly to fall again a few weeks later.
All of these findings are suggestive of an availability bias-the tendency for people to construct perceptions of likelihood based on the mental availability of instances (Folkes 1988; Kahneman and Tversky 1973 . People likely overestimate the likelihood of death by violent crime or gunshot accidents because examples of these things are easily brought to mind, perhaps fostered by their pervasive depiction in media. Deaths from accidental falls, on the other hand, suffer from the opposite bias: while it is easy to retrieve instances of friends and family members who survived falls from chairs and ladders, few can recall instances where such falls produced deaths. The changeable perceptions of natural-hazard risk reported by Burger and Palmer (1992) follows suit; in the days immediately following the earthquake it was likely far easier for residents to imagine future calamities than weeks later, when memories of the quake faded compared to more recent memories of life without hazards 1 .
It is important to note that too much should not be made of the fact that in these studies of subjective probability peoples' stated likelihoods of rare events tend to exceed their actuarial values-a finding that would seem counter the evidence that people undermitigate. Remembered that subjective estimates of probability are simply ratings of how certain people are that some event will occur as measured on a 0-to-1 scale. Because these judgments are not mathematical probabilities, raw comparisons to actuarial likelihoods may not be particularly meaningful. What is important about these findings is that subjective estimates of risk are influenced by factors that have no normative stature-such as how easy it is to imagine harmful events-something that, in turn, could cause harmful distortions of subjective orderings of risk to be distorted.
Beliefs that small samples tell all. Another reason why assessments of risk may be overly influenced by the recent past-even in the absence of availability effects-is a tendency for people to believe that the statistical properties of large samples should be evident in small samples-a bias Kahneman and Tversky (1973) term the representativeness heuristic. To illustrate the effect, consider a person who tosses a fair coin four times. The common intuition is that the most likely outcome of this experiment will be two heads and two tails-that is, the large-sample properties of the coin toss should be evident in the small sample. While this indeed the most likely outcome, people tend to think this outcome is far more likely than it really is (3/8ths). By reciprocal logic, the percentage mix observed in a small sample is taken to be a good estimate of the mix in the whole population. Hence, if the four coin tosses yield four heads, the instinct will be to conclude that the coin is biased-not that one is seeing a chance event consistent with a fair coin (on average such an outcome would occur once in every sixteen experiments).
In the context of hazard perception, the representative heuristic has two implications. One is that it validates the intuition that recent history is a fair guide to long-term likelihoods. If a region goes without a hurricane hit for a few years, it must be because the odds of getting hit have gone down (or were previously overestimated), not that such a run should be expected under a constant base probability.
The second is that it makes one people see deeper meaning into runs of events than would normatively be justified and fail to see Optimistic biases: I'm at risk, but you're more so. A final source of bias that arises in subjective judgments of likelihood is the tendency for people to believe that hazardous events are more likely to strike others than themselves-an effect termed the optimistic bias (e.g., Chandler, et al 1999; Sjoberg 2003; Weinstein 1980; 2000) . The standard take on the effect is that while people might well hold a general appreciation of the risks of hazards in their environment-be they hurricanes, earthquakes, or terrorist attacks-they are more likely to impact others than ourselves. Part of this effect may be explained in terms of the availability bias noted above: for the vast majority of us what we know about the damaging effects of hazards comes from witnessing their impacts on other people in other places-such as tsunamis in Asia, Avalanches in the Alps, and
Floods in a distant part of the country. As a result, there is a tendency to uniformly see disasters as other peoples' problems: a very real risk from which we are likely to be spared (Weinstein 1980) . As an illustration, after the 9-11 terrorist attacks Lermer, et al (2003) asked people to judge the probability that they would be hurt in a terrorist attack over the next 12 months. The data revealed a strong self-versus-others bias: people judged their own probability as being 20.5% (median 10%),, while that for the "average American" as being 47.8% (median 50%).
In other cases optimistic biases come from a tendency to believe that personal risk is lower because of an ability to control it. For example, teenagers tend to believe that they will be less likely to get into an accident than their peers, and individuals who engage in risky health behaviors (e.g. failures to use condoms) also seem themselves as selectively immune (e.g., Hunt, et; Raghubir and Menon 1998; Weinstein 1980) .
In these cases the mechanism appears to be a tendency for people to be more prone toward image scenarios that would not lead to a negative outcome (e.g., braking in the nick of time) than would (Weinstein 1980) .
Seeing the future as an extension of the present: biases in forecasts of impacts
When things go wrong after a natural hazard the first line of defense one often hears from emergency management officials is that things happened that were beyond the scope of predictability. After Hurricane Katrina, for example, FEMA officials were quick to cite the extreme nature of the storm surges experienced along the Mississippi coast (which exceeded actuarial predictions for a storm of its strength), and how the storm revealed flaws in the New Orleans levee system that we unknown prior to the event.
Even President Bush joined the fray when he told ABC news on September first, , "I don't think anybody anticipated a breach in the levees". Officials thus invoked the broker's defense of poor stock tips: because protection decisions are inherently risky, one can't criticize processes by focusing on their outcomes. While few seemed to buy the defense in the case of Katrina, in a more general sense the logic has merit: the instant one makes a decision not to protect against all possible risks, one accepts the possibility that errors will occasionally arise-cases where one would have invested more had one the benefit of hindsight. Twenty-one people died (Pielke , et al. 1999 2 .
The inability of the Rachlieu residents to imagine their complex in a vastly different state is an example of what Lowenstein and Rabin (2002) term a projection bias-a tendency for subjective forecasts about the future to be biased toward what is being experienced and felt in the present. At some level we all know this intuitively, such as in the age-old adage that one shouldn't go grocery shopping when hungry. The rationale is that one will end up buying a quantity and mix of goods that appeal to one in a hungry state (e.g., junk food) rather than later when one is more satiated. Read and van Leewuen (1998) offer laboratory evidence showing this very effect: in an experiment where hungry and satiated subjects to choose a snack that they would consume in a week when they were in a different hunger state. Consistent with a projection bias, their choices much more closely corresponded to their current states than their future ones:
hungry subjects tended to choose unhealthy snacks to eat later (when they would be satiated) while satiated subjects did the reverse.
More recently, Conlin, O Donoghue, and Vogelsang (2005) report field evidence if this same effect in analysis of mail-order returns. They find that early cold snaps induce people to prematurely order winter clothing-clothing that is subsequently returned. The explanation is that early encounters with cold induce beliefs that the cold will persist, prompting desires to order warmer clothes. When the weather turns warmer a few days later-as it almost certainly will-the belief that cold will persist is replaced by a belief that the warmth will persist, triggering a desire to return the clothes.
In the context of hazard planning, the projection bias offers a natural mechanism for explaining the reluctance of many decision makers to engage in costly acts of mitigation-such as the reluctance of many in New Orleans who had the means to evacuate before Katrina to do so. The projection bias implies that a contributing factor here may have been the mere difficulty people likely had imaging an environment vastly different from the one that they were currently facing, or how they would feel when faced with such an altered environment-in thus case a residential neighborhood under twenty feet of water,. The more difficult this future became to imagine, the more short-term decisions would tend to be anchored toward those that make the most sense in the present-here a preference for home versus the unfamiliar confines of distant shelter.
But the projection bias also has a more positive flip side: a tendency for individuals who suffer damage from hazards to underestimate the time it will take to recover, both physically and mentally. In press briefing on September 5 th after Hurricane Katrina, for example, the US Corps of Engineers estimated that ir might take "months" for floodwaters to be fully drained from city-an estimate that reflected the discouraged feelings of many that the timetable for the city's recovery might best be measured in years rather than weeks. But the reality was not quite as bad as first feared: some parts of city became accessible by natural drainage within a week of the storm, and drainage operations were completed by the beginning of October. Likewise, by early October commerce had also begun to return, with most clubs and restaurants in the French
Quarter re-opening for business-albeit to few customers.
Underestimation of recovery times has other examples; Gilbert and colleagues (e.g., Gilbert et. al 1998; Wilson and Gilbert 2003) offer several lines of evidence showing that people underestimate their ability to bounce back from negative life events-such as being denied tenure or incurring a disease. By comparing forecasts that people make about how they will feel after a negative event with the expressed feelings of those who have already incurred them, the general evidence is that people tend to be too pessimistic about their ability to mentally recover-they presume that the immediate negative reactions they would have to negative events would persist in the future. This psychic effect also has an analogue in environmental analogues: after Mt. St. Helens erupted in 1980 most ecologists predicted that would be years before the eruption zone witnessed a return of a significant array of plant and animal species. The actual pace of recovery, however, was much faster; plants began to re-grow within weeks, and wildlife returned soon thereafter (Dale, Swanson, and Crisafulli 2005) . In all these cases the excessive pessimism that immediately follows a negative event is the mirror image of the optimistic bias that arises before it: we simply find it difficult to imagine a negative set of circumstances (such as city under water) being made right again.
Implementation Errors Procrastination and preferences for the status quo
Not all decisions to under invest in mitigation arise from biased beliefs about probabilities or outcomes. In some cases such errors arise from the mere fact that people are unsure what acts of mitigation to undertake, or when. There is an extensive body of research showing that when people are faced with choosing among a set of options whose merits are uncertain versus a default of doing nothing, people will often prefer the latter-an effect known as the status-quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988) .
It is just such a bias, for example, that Schwitzer and Hershey (1997) argue contributes to the tendency for employees to under-contribute to flexible medical spending accounts.
While many may recognize the need for a larger allocation in a coming year, uncertainty about just what amount this should be leads many to retain the previous year's default.
Likewise, preferences for inaction have been found to increase with the number of available choice options (e.g., Dhar 1997; Tversky and Shafir 1992)-in essence, the more confusing the menu, the more one is likely to order nothing from it.
It should be emphasized, of course, that initial decisions to defer actions are rarely seen as being permanent; one imagines one is merely postponing the decision to a point in the near future when, hopefully, the correct course of action will become clearer, or one has more resources to pursue action. It only becomes permanent when thus cycle of procrastination becomes repetitive, or when people perpetually see a more favorable set of choices lying just around the bend. as expression of a desire to withhold protection; rather, they were merely expressions of a desire to momentarily delay protection to a time in the near future when its costs could be more reasonably affordable.
Decisions to invest in protection against low-probability events are particularly susceptible to procrastination for a straightforward reason: because the actuarial odds that a hazard will occur within any one short period of time are exceedingly small (odds heavily favor your yard not being stuck by lightning this afternoon), small differences in the timing of mitigation investments have little impact on overall risk exposure (one is not incurring a lot of additional risk by choosing to wait until tomorrow to buy a lightning rod) tomorrow versus today). On the other hand, small differences in the timing of out-ofpocket expenditures can have a large impact-at least psychically. The psychic benefits of putting off an investing in mitigation for a day will almost always seem large relative to the psychic costs of incurring an added day of exposure to a hazard. Legislative decisions to defer funding for mitigation projects have this flavor. In 2005, given that New Orleans had gone 40 years without a major flood, odds would seem to favor that it could make it through one more-hence freeing up money that could be used for other investments that seem more urgent (e.g., a war in Iraq).
O Donoghue and Rabin (1999; explain this effect in terms if the tendency for people to engage in hyperbolic discounting when considering the relative merits of current versus future events (Lowenstein and Prelec 1992) . Hyperbolic discounting is a tendency we have to disproportionately value immediate versus delayed actions. The effect is intuitively illustrated by common feelings about the prospect of delays in payments: one is much more likely to be perturbed hearing that a check one expected to get in the mail today will not come until tomorrow than hearing that a check one expected to get next week will be delayed a day.
When making a choice between a current or delayed mitigation investment this contrast is particularly acute. In the context of mitigation decisions, the benefit one is receiving is, by definition, uncertain and distant. One buys storm shutters not because they will used tomorrow but because they will be useful at an uncertain future dateperhaps later that year, perhaps ten years from now. In contrast, expenditures for mitigation are tangible and immediate. Hyperbolic discounting predicts that people will see a huge-and recurring-psychic benefit to delaying the investment relative to a more ambiguous-and unchanging-psychic cost. In this way, deeply held-beliefs that investments in mitigation are worthwhile can (paradoxically) co-exist with failures to invest in mitigation. Failures to invest come not from a conscious sense that such investments are not cost-effective, but rather from a recurrent series of decisions to postpone the investment one more day-with the end result being that no investment is ever made until it is too late.
This explanation for procrastination is somewhat less compelling, however, in cases where procrastination is observed in the face of an imminent hazard whose arrival time and severity is reasonably certain-such as when a coastal town has been put under a hurricane warning. In such cases all outcomes lie in the immediate future, and one might imagine that the psychic benefits of putting off the costs of mitigation for a few hours would be negligible, and offset by the psychic penalty of delaying receipt of its certain benefits-feelings of safety. Nevertheless, procrastination is often observed in such cases: people wait to the last second to evacuate (only to find they can't), and wait until a storm is upon them to secure supplies (only to find that none are available). has the downside that the supplies might not be available to buy after the storm.
Construal theory would predict a preference for the latter-more risky--act. The reason is a difference in valuations: when considering the option to buy in advance there would be a tendency to focus on more on the costs of the action (the chance of buying unneeded supplies) than the benefits (reassurance), but when considering the option to delay the focus would be more on the benefits (avoiding buying needed supplies) than thye costs (the possibility of unavailability). The consequence is a preference for procrastination:
future, risky options seem more attractive than current, conservative ones (see Sangristano, Trope, and Liberman 2002) .
Planning fallacies
Few costs) it takes to complete tasks (Buehler, Griffin, and Ross 1994; Kahneman and Lovallo 1993; Roy, Christenfield, and McKenzie 2005) . The bias is though to come from a confluence of three cognitive tendencies. The first is the tendency we mentioned earlier for people to be overly optimistic when imagining future sequences of events; we are more prone to imagine ways in which an uncertain process (such as draws from a state lottery) will turns out in our favor than otherwise. Hence, for example, students notoriously underestimate the time it takes to complete term papers because they compute the estimate by imaging sequences that will give rise to completion (e.g., web research is done by 9PM, the outline completed and introduction written by 11PM) rather than its non-completion (there is little on the web and trip to the library is needed, friends stop by to socialize). The second, which closely related, is that we underestimate the compounding nature of small delays; if a friend stops by and interrupts our web search for 15 minutes, this small delay could grow to a very long one if it causes us to miss a campus shuttle to the library, which causes us not to get started writing until midnight, which causes use to fall asleep, etc., etc. The third is a retrospective bias: our estimates of completion time may be too short because we construct estimates from recollections of past durations which are themselves positively biased (Roy, et. al 2005) .
The planning fallacy has several clear implications for hazard response. The most transparent is that it will cause people (and organizations) to be unable to complete planned acts of mitigation before the arrival of a hazard, such as the above example of underestimating evacuation times. It is also an error that seems to arise even in the most well-practiced of settings. A good case in point was the massive traffic jams that arose when 1.5 million residents of Galveston and Houston, Texas were ordered to evacuate in advance of Hurricane Rita in 2005. Although emergency traffic-control plans for hurricane evacuations had long been on the books in Texas, the plans proved inadequate.
Unforeseen, for example, was the fact that that many more residents would attempt to evacuate than were required to do (2.7 million; Austin American Statesman; October 27, 2005) which produced traffic jams of a Herculean scale. Anecdotes included motorists taking up to 15 hours to travel 13 miles (Houston Chronicle, September 22 nd ), with delays being exacerbated by the fact that few motorists, for their part, had planned enough fuel, food, or water for such long waits. Tragically, the greatest loss of life during the storm occurred in the course of attempts to flee it, when 23 nursing home residents died in a bus fire during the evacuation.
The second implication is that it may contribute to underestimation of the damaging impact of hazards when they arrive-hence, in turn, underestimation in elsewhere-such as broken glass and pebbles-effects that were, apparently, underpredicted in the course of structural design.
Errors in planning for others
A final class of errors that we consider are those that arise when mitigation decisions are not made by an individual directly, but are rather overseen by a central planning agent. Most real-world mitigation scenarios, of course, involve at least some of this element; country emergency planning officials are charged with the responsibility of ordering evacuations, central governments oversee decisions about the overall level of investment in mitigation as well as where these investments will be targeted. In such cases errors made by policy-makers are not only subject to many of the same sources of bias discussed above, but also two more: an inability to accurately anticipate the preferences and actions of those who will be directly affected by the hazard, and tendency to underestimate the time and costs associated with implementing plans.
Why we can't make decisions for others: Empathy Gaps. People have a hard time putting ourselves in the shoes of others. This effect, which has been referred to as both the empathy gap (Van Boven, Dunning, and Loewenstein 2000) and the false-consensus effect (Hoch 1988; Marks and Miller 1987; Ross, Greene, and House 1977) is an extension of the projection bias in personal forecasting discussed earlier; in the same way that people have a hard time decoupling current emotions and preferences from forecasts of future preferences, people also have a hard time imagining the preferences they would have were they in someone else's shoes. In such cases, forecasts tend to be biased toward their own (e.g., Hoch 1988; Holmes 1968) . This limitation in perspective-taking has been used, for example, to explain why buyers and sellers often have a difficult time reach agreements: buyers have a hard time fully appreciating the aversion for loss that causes sellers to (often) overvalue their possessions (the endowment effect), while sellers have an equally hard time viewing their possessions from the perspective of a buyer who is spared this bias (Van Boven, Dunning, and Loewenstein 2000) .
In the context of policy-making for hazard mitigation such biases are, of course, potentially lethal in their consequences. Policies for mitigation, by definition, are formulated in environments that are physically and emotionally remote from those that will exist at the time of the hazard, and rarely by the same people who will be the targets of the hazard. As such, planners face the prospect of succumbing to errors in both faulty projection-such as underestimating the likelihood of panic--and temporal construalsuch as implementing plans that are presume a willingness to adopt formidable levels of risk (Sangristano, Trope, and Liberman (2002) .
Can anything be done?
To this point this essay has presented what would seem to be a a rather bleak view of prospects of the ability of individuals and governments to make inefficient mitigation decisions. Due to the core the biases of learning by attending to short-term feedback, being unable to accurately see the future consequences of current choices, and by making poor trade-odds in time (e.g., procrastination biases) investments in mitigation are often both too little and too late. Moreover, we are probe to perpetual repetition of past mistakes.
But it is important to put this view in perspective. The fact remains that the vast majority of warnings tend to go heading when issued, people do invest in mitigation, and catastrophic failures area rare-it is only when we encounter nature's rare extremes that our decision making failures come painfully to light. In addition, while trial-and-error learning may be a slow process, it is nevertheless evolutionarily efficient-to the degree that a certain adaptations are optimal, we will come to adopt them-though perhaps not as soon as we might ideally like (Meyer and Kunreuther 2005) . Hence, we the see a reasonable goal for effective mitigation policies as not to eliminate the risk that decision errors will be made-that is impossible-but rather to accelerate the pace of natural learning, and preemptively avoid mistakes by having a better understanding of the underlying psychology that drives them.
To illustrate this, following the three major themes of this essay, a reasonable goal is to develop policies that ease the negative effects of the three classes of bias focused on here: learning, foresight, and time trade-offs.
Enhancing what we learn from experience
It is a natural instinct after a disaster for individuals and policy makers to focus energies on taking actions that allow communities to return to a normal way of life; that is, make the event a thing of the past. But such an emphasis on forgetting over remembering has its obvious downsides. For example, consider Pielke, et al's (1999) description of the reconstruction that took place along the Mississppi Gulf coast after (Pielke, et al. 1999) While new building codes were indeed developed and suggestions for systematic redevelopment were proposed, the former were spottily enforced and the latter set aside in the understandable urge for people to get their lives back on course. But as we discovered in the Summer of 2005, this haste has a real cost; most of what was rebuilt during Camille was destroyed again during Katrina.
A major challenge to both policy makers and individuals is thus to design recovery efforts that manage to achieve two, seemingly conflicting goals; that of righting communities as quickly as possible while rebuilding in a way that maximally learns from past mistakes. How to achieve both? The only way it can effectively happen, of course, is if such recovery planning is done ex-ante in the form of long-term contingent reconstruction and recovery plans. One of the major critiques of hurricane planning in New Orleans was that policies were in place dealt only with the earliest stages of a flood disaster-how to get people to survive the initial impact of the event. Shockingly absent was careful foresight into the longer-term problems of recovery that would obviously follow, such as transportation and housing of those in temporary shelters and the treatment of displaced businesses. Likewise, the Mississippi Gulf coast now faces the same set of challenges it did after Camille: there is a widespread appreciation for the need for rebuilding to be done carefully and safely, but such time-consuming planning processes are fighting a losing battle of time against the greater need to provide homes and places of employment for residents.
While the virtue of advance recovery planning might seem transparent, the greatest obstacle in many cases may be a psychic one. It requires individuals and communities to think the unthinkable-the real possibility that they may be confronted with a disaster that destroys their way of life. But as painful as such a planning exercise may be, the costs of engaging in it as a hypothetical event are small relative to those of engaging in the process after a disaster has impacted.
Aiding Foresight: tools to increase compliance with mitigation advice
The reluctance of both individuals and communities to engage in advance contingent planning accrues, at its core, to one of the fundamental classes of biases that we discussed earlier: the inability of people to have clear insights into how they would respond to future life events. Not only does limited foresight impair abilities to set longterm plans, but also manifested in highly short-term aversions of mitigation, such as failing to see the values of mitigation.
In recent years a large body of work has developed seeking to find the best means of overcoming short-term thinking biases in a number of domains of personal safety. The outcome of this work, however, has not been universally encouraging in its prescriptions;
if there has been an overarching finding, is that persuasion in such domains is often difficult to achieve. But this result, in some ways, should not be seen as surprising; since few would consciously want to take actions that put them in harm's way, persuasion faces the difficult task of overcoming the deep-rooted cognitive biases that lie at the source of the behavior (such as empathy gaps). These are biases that the decision maker is likely unaware that they possess.
Nevertheless, prior work has shown that if the source of bias can be identified, inroads can be made in enhancing mitigation decisions. In the above work we suggested that reluctances to engage in mitigation typically emanate from one-or a combinationof three biases:
1. Misperceptions of personal risk or vulnerability (the perceived likelihood that the hazard will occur),;
2. Misperceptions of the severity of impacts of hazards (both physical and emotional) conditional on their occurrence; and 3. Procrastination in implementing mitigation.
We will defer discussion of the third driver until the next section when we discuss aids to temporal planning. De-biasing strategies for the first two will be taken up in turn. Two, closely-related, de-biasing mechanisms have explored in such cases, both with some success. One involves facilitating the mental generation of risk-consistent instances-such as helping people imagine the different ways that an area protected by levees might find itself inundated (e.g., Raghubir and Menon 1998 ). Earlier we noted that overly optimistic beliefs about hazards sometime arise from proportional availability biases-the harder it is to think of ways that a hazard could occur relative to not occur, the less likely the hazard is perceived to be (e.g., Schwartz, et; al 1991) . In a series of studies designed to explore the effectiveness of advertisements aimed at increasing protective behavior with respect to the spread of the Hepatitus C virus and AIDS viruses, Menon, Block, and Ramanathan (2002) and Raghubir and Menon (1998) find that personal-optimism biases can be over come by designing messages that either facilitate visualization of the mechanics by which the virus can be transmitted (such as through unprotected sex; Raghubir and Menon 1998) or by including examples of transmission methods that people recognize as occurring comparatively often (e.g., contracting
Hepatitus C by from a shared toothbrush).
Closely related is the approach of tailoring persuasions to unique circumstances of the decision maker. When governments offer advice to residents about how to protect against hazards it usually takes the form of generic catch-all lists where only a subset of precautions would be seen as relevant to any one decision maker. For example, a recent preparedness guide for hurricanes prepared by the NOAA and the Red Cross (U. S.
Department of Commerce, 2001) included a lengthy list or preparations designed to encompass most possible circumstances-such as reminders to be sure to bring baby food and diapers if one is going to a shelter with small children, the need to identify a safe room within every home, and make conditional plans to insure the safety of pets.
The downside of such communications is as above; the more personally-relevant cues are lost among a myriad of less-relevant ones, the less persuasive becomes the overall message. Consistent with this idea, Kreuter and Strecher (1995) tradeoff between actuarial risks and benefits. The upshot of this is that people may be prone to under-mitigate far in advance of a hazard because the emotions that are essential to triggering behavior are not evident (Read and Loewemstein 2001) .
A natural implication is that one might thus be able to heighten compliance by designing communications focused on triggering emotions similar to those likely to be felt in the course of the actual hazard. But doing this, unfortunately, turns out to be s much easier said than done. There are a couple of impeding factors. The first is that emotions are often difficult to vicariously reproduce. In the same way that it was impossible for Read and Loewenstein's (2001) subjects to fully recall their sensory responses they had to having their hands in ice water after a delay, is difficult to instill the same feelings of fear or regret that one might have in the course of experiencing a hazard by viewing a brief communication that asks one to imagine such an experience. The second is that when emotions are triggered by communications the greater effect may be to suppress processing of the message itself, A good case in point is the finding that fear appeals are often ineffective in inducing behavioral change (e.g., Block and Williams 2002; Krisher, Darley, and Darley, 1973) . When individuals are exposed to communications that trigger fear (for example, a graphic depiction of a car accident), a common response is not to comply with the content of the message (e.g., wear seat belts) but rather flee from the message itself. Because of this the common intuition that the best way to encourage compliance is to show vivid depictions of the consequences of noncompliance is often misplaced; the greater effect is decreased message comprehension rather than increased hazard avoidance.
On the other hand, there is developing evidence that appeals that tap into other emotional responses to hazards-most notably regret-can be effective in creasing compliance. In a recent paper Passyn, Luce, and Kahn (2005) offer showing that undergraduates were more likely to adopt proactive condoms after viewing communications designed to trigger regret emotions compared to communications that carried a fear appeal and one that carried factual risk information. The regret appeal seemed to work in this context because it heightened senses of personal responsibility for preventive action while at the same time being unthreatening-hence allowing the content of the message to be processed.
There is also some limited evidence that empathy gaps can be lessened by engaging decision makers in training modules that simulate an actual hazard experience. Thomson, et al (2005) report findings showing that children's judgments about streetcrossing safety were improved by engaging in a virtual-reality training exercise that simulated a variety of potentially hazardous crossing scenarios. On the other hand, as we noted at the outset, the City of New Orleans' staging of hurricane-disaster weeks before
Hurricane Katrina seemed to do little to improve either planning or response to that event.
Finally, a unique problem that arises in natural hazards is the problem of noncompliance in the hours just before a hazard sets in, such as last-minute refusals to evacuate. What-if anything-can be done in such cases is far from well understood, as it is a problem tar removed from previous studies of compliance.. One possibility here is that the close proximity of the real hazard to the time of a communication may make fear appeals-normally an ineffective instrument-effective.
Aiding Temporal Planning
The final course of remedies are those aimed at aiding errors that accrue to poor inter-temporal judgments about the optimal timing of mitigation. As we noted earlier, in many instances cases of under-mitigation arise not because decision makers underestimated the likelihood of hazards or their potential impact, but rather because of procrastination (preferences for deferral).
Here a couple of solutions come to mind. One is a familiar timing aid used in retailing: create perceptions of rigid time limits. In some hazards settings this is done already; NOAA, for example;, annually has a "hurricane preparedness week" at the start of each hurricane season designed to both heighten awareness and consolidate decision making. Likewise, governments could publicize mitigation calendars that organize "to do" lists around fixed completion dates.
Biases due to a reluctance to incur out-of-pocket expenses are, clearly, far harder to remedy by persuasion alone. In such cases government intervention would seem required-such the State of Florida's pilot program to provide no pay-back loans fir the purchase of storm shutters. Unfortunately, even those remedies may be limited in their effectiveness, as the loans themselves might be seen as costly to secure (in time and hassle), and they do little, of course, to compensate the non-monetary costs of the mitigation.
Postscript: the role of governments versus individuals
The fact that human decision makers are limited by cognitive biases is sometimes taken to imply that the best remedy lies in placing restrictions on the freedom of decisions; i.e., improved benevolent central planning that either legislates action by individuals (e.g., imposes more rigid rules on evacuation behavior), or channels public funds to provide financial incentives for specific actions. The central limitation of such and argument, however, is that it has legitimacy only to the degree that benevolent central planning is free of the decision biases that it is meant to cure. If the current essay carries no other message, it is that such an assertion could not be further than the truth; in most case the most far-reaching decision errors we illustrated were those being made by policy makers charged with responsibility of building safer societies. In our view, if a resource emphasis should be placed, it is to develop policies that encourage individuals to improve the quality of decisions they make for themselves, not cede these choices to agents.
